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Abstract
Sudden and protracted oil-price increases are generally accompanied by economic contrac-
tions and high inﬂation (as documented e.g. by Hamilton (1983, 1996)). The oil crises of the
1970s and the subsequent world stagﬂation provide one major example of the linkages between
energy prices and the macroeconomy. Not surprisingly, the surge in oil prices observed since
2003 has raised concerns among analysts and policy makers. The macroeconomic eﬀects are
expected to be diﬀerent from the past, though. One reason is the steady reduction in oil de-
pendence in most advanced economies over the last decades. Another reason is the nature of
the recent oil price increase, which is mainly attributed to higher world demand as opposed to
the large supply component of the oil-price shock experienced in the 70s.
In this paper, we build a model that is able to replicate the current scenario of higher
oil prices and use it to address some normative and positive issues concerning the interaction
between ﬁscal and monetary policy.
The framework is a three-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model,
which is characterized by two net oil-importing countries (US and the euro area) and one oil-
exporting country (OPEC). A crucial feature of the model is the assumption that oil-prices are
partially endogenous to the world economy. This allows for demand-driven oil-price escalations
as well as for international spillovers of national ﬁscal and monetary policies.
We calibrate the model in order to reproduce a set of key stylized facts, as in Backus and
Crucini (2000). The facts are captured by ﬁrst moments, standard deviations, correlation of
domestic variables and cross-country correlations. The parameter values that provide the best
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1ﬁt of the model with the data are close to those estimated in recent DSGE models of the US and
the euro area (e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003), de Walque and Wouters (2004) and Christiano
et al. (2001)).
We use the calibrated model to analyze the mix of monetary and ﬁscal policies adopted by
oil importing countries. First, ﬁxing energy taxes to the levels prevailing in the US and the
euro area, we derive the optimal (within a class of simple policy rules) monetary reaction to
an oil price shock. In particular, we analyze whether monetary policy should respond to the
consumer price level or to a narrower measure of inﬂation. Second, we address the implications
of the observed diﬀerences in energy taxes (substantially higher in the euro area relative to the
US) for the optimal response of monetary policy. Third, we compute the welfare-maximizing
level of energy taxes and ask what is the optimal monetary policy reaction to an oil price shock
under this scenario.
Our policy evaluation is based on a second order approximation of the welfare function of the
representative consumer in the oil-importing countries. The global interdependence implies that,
for example, an anti-inﬂationary policy implemented by one oil-importing country in response to
an oil-price shock has repercussions on inﬂation and output dynamics of the other oil-importing
country. The optimal weight attached to oil-price changes by one monetary authority will,
therefore, depend on the response to oil prices of the other central bank. Likewise, as the size
of oil taxes can aﬀect the response of domestic and foreign inﬂation and output, ﬁscal and
monetary decisions aﬀect each other, domestically as well as internationally. We study the
cooperative as well as the non-cooperative solution of the policy game for a speciﬁc and limited
set of policy instruments and under the assumption of full commitment of the policy makers to
linear operational feedback rules.
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